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Case Comment
Overlooking a Sixth Amendment Framework
State v. Kirk R., 812 A.2d 113 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002), aff'd, 857 A.2d 908
(Conn. 2004).
As the Supreme Court further plunges the world of criminal sentencing
into turmoil, state courts in particular are scrutinizing their own statutory
sentencing schemes and judicial practices. Ever since the Court's holding in
Apprendi v. New Jersey' (recently reformulated and expanded in Blakely v.
Washington2), states have been called upon to ensure that trial judges do not
usurp the jury's exclusive fact-finding power and thereby violate criminal
defendants' Sixth Amendment guaranty of a trial by jury. While the legal
framework that protected this Sixth Amendment right has been developing
for decades, Apprendi formulated a bright-line rule that prohibits a judge
from finding by herself during sentencing, instead of submitting to a jury
for determination at trial, any fact that increases a defendant's sentence
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum absent that fact.3 Under
Apprendi, scores of factual determinations were taken from judges and
placed back in the hands of juries.
But while courts have continued to occupy themselves with defining
the scope of Apprendi and its progeny, they have remained blind to a more
fundamental, and increasingly prevalent, problem. By mechanically
examining the effect a factor has on the length of a defendant's sentence in
determining whether it must be submitted to a jury, courts have permitted
the Apprendi bright-line rule to eviscerate the preexisting substantive
method for making that determination.
1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
3. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
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Long before Apprendi, the Court applied a less mechanical, more
substantive analysis to determine whether a fact must be submitted to a
jury. In Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Court analyzed how the presence or
absence of a particular fact related to the underlying crime in order to
determine whether or not that fact was indeed an essential element of that
crime. Apprendi did not replace or eliminate the need for this Mullaney
inquiry; it merely short-circuited the inquiry in cases where the finding at
issue increased the sentence beyond the otherwise available maximum
sentence.
The current widespread misapplication of the Apprendi doctrine
threatens the very Sixth Amendment and due process protections Apprendi
was designed to safeguard. A recent Connecticut Appellate Court case,
State v. Kirk R.,5 illustrates this problem. The Kirk R. court, relying
primarily on the Apprendi doctrine, failed to conduct a Mullaney analysis
and thereby permitted the finding of a particular element of a crime to be
removed from the jury's purview, allowing the trial judge to make his own
unilateral determination at sentencing.
Part I presents the relevant doctrinal background, describing the
continuum between "element of a crime" and "sentencing factor" and
demonstrating how Apprendi and its progeny do not-and were never
intended to--displace the preexisting and entirely discrete element-of-a-
crime analysis. Part II discusses the facts and holding of Kirk R. Part III
argues that the Connecticut court improperly relied on the Apprendi
doctrine as relevant to, and even dispositive of, this issue; in truth, all
Apprendi could have done was remove a special protection from the Kirk R.
court's arsenal, forcing the court to then apply Mullaney's more basic
element-of-a-crime test. Part IV closes by addressing the impact of Blakely
on this Comment's thesis.
I
In the landmark In re Winship decision, the Court held that the
prosecution must prove "beyond a reasonable doubt . . . every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged.",6
Although this standard gave defendants significant constitutional
protection, Winship failed to provide lower courts with much guidance
regarding what specific facts are "necessary to constitute the crime." As a
4. 421 U.S. 684, 697-98 (1975). The fact at issue in Mullaney, a murder case, was the
presence or absence of malice.
5. State v. Kirk R. (Kirk R. 1), 812 A.2d 113 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002), aff'd, 857 A.2d 908
(Conn. 2004).
6. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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result, the Court in subsequent cases voiced its concern that a state could
manipulate its way out of this burden of proof merely by "redefin[ing] the
elements that constitute different crimes, characterizing them as factors that
bear solely on the extent of punishment. 7
In Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Court addressed this concern by prescribing
a substantive analysis of a fact's traditional relevance to the underlying
crime to determine whether that fact should be deemed an element of that
crime.8 Specifically, the Court reasoned that because "the presence or
absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation," the fact at issue, had
traditionally been "the single most important factor in determining the
degree of culpability attaching to an unlawful homicide," that fact
constituted an element of the crime and had to be proven to the jury beyond
a reasonable doubt.9 Although the decision did not set forth a hard-and-fast
rule, it provided an analytical framework that the Court has applied on
numerous occasions. 0
Within the bounds of Mullaney, legislatures retained the discretion to
classify facts as either elements of a crime or as sentencing factors. In
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, for instance, the Court held that, under a
Pennsylvania statute, a judge could consider "visible possession of a
firearm" as a factor in calculating a defendant's sentence, even absent a
specific jury finding on the matter.' 1 But Mullaney and its progeny made
clear that there were limits to this legislative discretion.
7. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698; see also Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 240-42 (1999)
(describing the Court's reasoning in Mullaney).
8. 421 U.S. at 691-99. The notion of employing a substantive analysis to determine whether a
given fact constitutes an element of the crime is not unique to Mullaney or to the federal system.
See, e.g., State v. Wedge, 652 P.2d 773, 777 (Or. 1982) (prescribing a test for Oregon state
constitutional protections in which "facts which constitute the crime are for the jury and those
which characterize the defendant are for the sentencing judge").
9. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 696.
10. See, e.g., Jones, 526 U.S. at 234-37. In the context of discerning legislative intent, the
Jones Court relied upon the notion that bodily injury, the factor at issue, had "traditionally been
treated, both by Congress and by the state legislatures, as defining an element of the offense of
aggravated robbery," and held that a defendant's sentence could be increased on that basis only if
a jury determined that bodily harm had resulted. Id. at 235; see also Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (permitting a trial judge's imposition of an enhanced sentence on the
basis of a prior conviction). The Court's "conclusion in Almendarez-Torres turned heavily on the
fact that the additional sentence to which the defendant was subject was the prior commission of a
serious crime." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488 (2000). Recidivism "is a traditional, if
not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court's increasing an offender's sentence" and
"does not relate to the commission of the offense." Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 243-44
(internal quotation marks omitted).
For an overview of the evolution of this doctrine, see Leslie Yalof Garfield, Back to the
Future: Does Apprendi Bar a Legislature's Power To Shift the Burden of Proof away from the
Prosecution by Labeling an Element of a Traditional Crime as an Affirmative Defense?, 35
CONN. L. REv. 1351, 1356-80 (2003).
11. 477 U.S. 79, 84-91 (1986).
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Despite its intuitive appeal, the Mullaney framework was subjective,
complex, and difficult to apply. Nearly five years ago, the Supreme Court
crafted a supplementary bright-line rule in Apprendi. The Court held that
any fact that itself increases the length of a defendant's sentence beyond the
otherwise available maximum must be submitted to a jury, regardless of its
traditional relevance to the crime at issue. 12 Until Apprendi, trial court
judges at sentencing hearings comfortably made findings of fact ranging
from the quantity of drugs to the presence of racial animus during the
commission of a crime, so long as the fact found did not constitute a
substantive element of the crime. After Apprendi, such facts had to be
found by a jury during the trial, or else they would be unavailable for use by
the court in calculating a defendant's sentence. In short, Apprendi
recognized that the impact certain factors have on defendants' sentences
can alone justify mandatory submission to a jury, apart from the preexisting
Mullaney framework for that determination.
Within the context of the Apprendi rule, a question arose concerning
facts that increased the minimum available sentence but remained within
the prescribed statutory range. Two years after Apprendi, the Court resolved
the issue in Harris v. United States, a highly criticized 5-4 decision that
limits Apprendi to extended ceilings only, excluding mandatory minimums
from its protection.'
3
Since Apprendi, and even more so since Harris, state courts have
mechanically ruled on these challenges by looking only to the effect a
particular factor had on a sentence.' 4 If the finding of a particular fact
12. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 ("Despite what appears to us the clear 'elemental' nature of the
factor here, the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect-does the required finding
expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?").
13. 536 U.S. 545, 567 (2002) ("Within the range authorized by the jury's verdict, however,
the political system may channel judicial discretion-and rely upon judicial expertise-by
requiring defendants to serve minimum terms after judges make certain factual findings.").
14. The problem is widespread. In the three years since Harris, multiple jurisdictions have
fallen prey to this mistake. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 70 P.3d 454, 460 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) ("In
sum, '[w]hether chosen by the judge or the legislature, the facts guiding judicial discretion below
the statutory maximum need not be... submitted to the jury, or proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.... The judge may impose the minimum, the maximum, or any other sentence within the
range without seeking further authorization from [the grand and petit] juries-and without
contradicting Apprendi.' (alterations and second omission in original) (quoting Harris, 536 U.S.
at 565)); State v. Lee, 844 So. 2d 970, 999-1000 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (finding the statute at issue
to be "nothing more than a sentencing enhancement statute that provides for the imposition of a
mandatory minimum sentence... , with such sentence not exceeding the maximum statutory
sentence for that offense" and consequently ruling that the "statutory scheme, providing for the
determination of the statute's applicability by the trial court, not a jury, is entirely within the
constitutional parameters set forth in McMillan and reaffirmed in Harris"); Young v. State, 806
A.2d 233, 251, 251-52 (Md. 2002) (examining the extent of the "increased penalty" in disposing
of defendant's Sixth Amendment challenge (italics and capitalization altered)); State v. Shattuck,
No. C6-03-362, 2004 WL 772220, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2004) (upholding district
court's finding that defendant qualified for mandatory minimum sentence on facts not found by a
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increased the sentence beyond the statutory maximum, then it was
submitted to a jury (per Apprendi). If not, trial court judges were allowed to
make the requisite determination (seemingly per Harris). This clear-cut
binary test appealed to courts and quickly became the standard approach for
judicial review of sentencing challenges based on deprivation of the right to
trial by jury.
II
In State v. Kirk R., the Connecticut Appellate Court reviewed a state
statute defining the crime of sexual assault in the first degree.15 The statute
prescribes a sentence of up to twenty years and imposes a mandatory
minimum sentence often years if the victim is under the age of ten.
1 6
The defendant in Kirk R. was convicted by a jury of two counts of
sexual assault in the first degree. At sentencing, the state moved to have the
defendant's sentence imposed pursuant to the special ten-year mandatory
minimum provision because the victims of the crime were younger than ten.
The trial court complied, imposing the ten-year mandatory minimum
sentence by unilaterally determining the victims' ages at sentencing., 7 The
defendant subsequently appealed the court's finding on the grounds that the
jury had never determined that the victims were under the age of ten.
Consequently, the defendant argued that the imposition of a mandatory
minimum violated his due process rights. 
1 8
On appeal, the Kirk R. court relied on Harris to uphold the trial court,
ruling that, because the aggravating factor of victim age did not increase the
sentence beyond the otherwise available maximum but instead only raised
the minimum, that fact did not constitute an element of the crime and could
consequently be removed from the purview of the jury without violating the
Sixth Amendment.' 9
jury, in primary reliance on Harris); State v. Luckey, 840 A.2d 862, 869 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2004) (failing to substantively analyze the statute at issue and instead relying on Harris to
dispose of defendant's claim).
15. KirkR. I, 812 A.2d at 115.
16. Id. at 119 & n.1 1 (describing the statutory scheme).
17. Id. at 116.
18. Id. at 116, 118.
19. Id. at 120. The Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court on the
merits, finding that the age of each victim was indeed an element of the crime at issue. State v.
Kirk R. (Kirk R. fl), 857 A.2d 908, 913 (Conn. 2004). The court affirmed the judgment, however,
because it found the error to be harmless. Id. at 919-21. The implications of the Connecticut
Supreme Court's decision are addressed infra note 28 and accompanying text.
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III
The scope of Harris is fundamentally more limited than recent opinions
like Kirk R. have presumed. Harris stands for the proposition that facts do
not become elements of a crime "merely because legislatures require the
judge to impose a minimum sentence when those facts are found-a
sentence the judge could have imposed absent the finding., 20 But cases like
Kirk R. have improperly treated this proposition as dispositive of a
defendant's Sixth Amendment challenge. Mullaney held, and nothing has
ever suggested otherwise, that facts can indeed become elements of a crime
if their substantive relation to the crime at issue qualifies them as traditional
21elements of the crime. Apprendi never purported to overrule or even
replace Mullaney. As a result, the substantive difference between these tests
manifests itself in a particularly dangerous way in cases like Kirk R. that
pass the Apprendi test but would fail the Mullaney test-if that test were
properly applied by the courts.
In Kirk R., the appellate court correctly disposed of its requisite
Apprendi-Harris analysis but should have then turned to the substantive
Mullaney analysis before deeming the fact a sentencing factor and
removing it from the jury.2 Indeed, the facts and statute at the center of
Kirk R. present a compelling basis on which to render the fact at issue an
element of the crime under Mullaney. The facts that triggered the ten-year
mandatory minimum sentences were the victims' ages. Age has
traditionally played a critical role in defining sexual acts-and in the
context of illegal sexual acts, defining the crime. From statutory rape to
sexual assault, our laws have attributed particular significance to the ages of
those involved in a sexual crime. 3 This appeal to the traditional treatment
of a given factor is precisely what the Mullaney Court itself used in
20. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 560 (2002).
21. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698-99 (1975).
22. The Kirk R. I court purported to proceed beyond the perfunctory Apprendi-Harris test and
engage in legislative intent analysis. 812 A.2d at 118 ("At issue is whether the legislature intended
the fact that the victims were younger than ten years of age to be treated as an element of the
offense .... ). This Comment argues, however, that even such an effort would fall short of
satisfying constitutional demands, because Mullaney dictates that traditional treatment can render
a fact an element of the crime even in the face of contrary legislative intent. See Mullaney, 421
U.S. at 699. Moreover, the appellate court's legislative intent analysis is misleading because the
court mistakenly applied Harris as dispositive of the legislative intent issue. See Kirk R. 1, 812
A.2d at 120.
23. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-21(a)(2) (2004) ("Any person who.., has contact with
the intimate parts, as defined in section 53a-65, of a child under the age of sixteen years or
subjects a child under sixteen years of age to contact with the intimate parts of such person, in a
sexual and indecent manner likely to impair the health or morals of such child.... shall be guilty
of... a class B felony .... (emphasis added)).
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deciding that malice qualified as an element of the crime charged in that
case.
24
We need look no further than the text of the very statute at issue in Kirk
R. to validate this claim. Subsection (a)(2) of the statute enumerates the age
of the victim as an indispensable element of the underlying crime, inasmuch
as only sexual assault of a victim under thirteen years of age qualifies as
first-degree sexual assault. 25 Not surprisingly, the Kirk R. trial court
properly submitted this element to the jury for its finding.26 It is irrational to
treat the very same type of fact in subsection (b)-the age of the victim-as
a sentencing factor that need not be submitted to the jury. Doing so ignores
Mullaney's mandate to evaluate the relationship between a fact and a crime
in ascertaining the fact's status as an element of that crime.27
The Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court on
the merits, finding that the age of the victim was indeed an element of the
crime. The Connecticut Supreme Court supported its position, however, on
a narrow statutory interpretive basis. In doing so, the court failed to
resurrect the Mullaney mandate or rectify the appellate court's mistake of
allowing Apprendi to overshadow the required substantive test.28
24. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 696-99.
25. State v. Kirk R. (Kirk R. I1), 857 A.2d 908, 910 n.3 (Conn. 2004). The statute provides
three other circumstances that amount to first-degree sexual assault, including the use or threat of
force, the presence of multiple perpetrators, or a mentally incapacitated victim. Id.
26. The trial court's jury instructions explained that "'[t]he second element of the offense
charged is that the sexual intercourse was with a person [who] was under thirteen. That is, as she
had not yet reached her thirteenth birthday at the time of the sexual intercourse."' Id. at 911
(second alteration in original) (emphasis added).
27. Indeed, the only basis for distinguishing between subsections (a) and (b) is that they
appear in two different subsections of the statute-a form-over-substance approach that has been
unequivocally rejected by the courts. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 234 (1999)
("[S]tatutory drafting occurs against a backdrop not merely of structural conventions of varying
significance, but of traditional treatment of certain categories of important facts .... (emphasis
added)). In short, "the mere fact that a state legislature has placed a criminal component within the
sentencing provisions of the criminal code does not mean that the finding of [the provision] is not
an essential element of the offense." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 472 (2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
28. The Connecticut Supreme Court evidenced a clear uneasiness with the perfunctory
approach of reviewing a factor's quantitative effect on a defendant's sentence to determine its
status as an element of the crime. The court recognized that clear legislative intent to include a
fact as an element of the crime trumps Apprendi analysis. Kirk R. II, 857 A.2d at 915 ("[T]here is
nothing that prevents our legislature from requiring the jury to make a finding in order to oblige a
trial court to impose a mandatory minimum sentence .... ). Nevertheless, the court fell short of
pointing to a separate Mullaney substantive test as the basis for its disagreement with the appellate
court. Instead, the court relied exclusively on a survey of the legislative history of the statute at
issue. Id. at 915-19. In essence, the Connecticut Supreme Court made the same mistake as the
appellate court in ruling that because the statute at issue "creates a mandatory minimum
sentencing provision and does not increase, in an Apprendi sense, the statutorily authorized
penalty for the underlying crime," it is "undisputed that the legislature was not constitutionally
prohibited from permitting the sentencing court, as opposed to a jury, to determine whether a
victim of sexual assault in violation of § 53a-70(a) was less than ten years of age." Id. at 915.
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IV
In the wake of Blakely v. Washington, one thing has changed: The
scope of Apprendi is once again up in the air, as it was in 2002 when the
Court decided Harris. Blakely narrows the range of sentences that qualify
as authorized maximums, 29 thus increasing the scope of Apprendi
protections.30  Regardless of the outcome of the Supreme Court's
clarification of its decision, 31 there will still be many cases that can never
qualify for Apprendi protections. This is true because many facts do not
increase a defendant's sentence beyond the prescribed range, irrespective of
how that range is defined.
In those instances, the thesis advanced in this Comment becomes
critical. This Comment argues that there is a second, independent, and often
overlooked test that must be employed (and satisfied) before the finding of a
particular fact may be delegated to a trial court judge and removed from the
purview of the jury. This test was made concrete in a line of cases beginning
with Mullaney v. Wilbur and has never been overturned. Proliferation of the
more recent bright-line test-the Apprendi test-has contributed to the
systematic disregard of the original substantive test. Only an unwavering
insistence on placing Apprendi in its proper context will ensure that the
decision and its progeny, including Harris, maintain their proper scope and
ensure the protection of defendants' Sixth Amendment rights.
-Jason Colin Cyrulnik
29. Under Blakely, a sentence exceeds the available maximum (and thus fails the Apprendi
test) not only if it goes beyond the statutory maximum sentence for a particular crime, but even if
it exceeds the presumptive range designated by a state's sentencing guidelines for the particular
crime. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537-38 (2004).
30. While Blakely's immediate effect is to increase the range of cases covered by Apprendi, a
likely outgrowth of Blakely may have the opposite effect. Consider Frank Bowman's proposal to
save the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, should the Court apply Blakely to the federal system:
Conform the guideline maximums to the applicable statutory maximums, thus ensuring that the
guideline calculations would involve adjustments only to minimums (permitted by Harris) and
have no impact on maximums (prohibited by Apprendi and Blakely). See Memorandum from
Frank 0. Bowman, M. Dale Professor of Law, Indiana University, to U.S. Sentencing
Commission, in 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 364, 367-68 (2004). If such a proposal were
adopted-at either the state or federal level--courts would have to pay particular attention to the
substantive distinction between elements of the crime and sentencing factors to ensure that
judicial discretion does not run wild and to avoid stripping juries of their fact-finding role.
31. See United States v. Fanfan, No. 04-105 (U.S. filed July 21, 2004, argued Oct. 4, 2004);
United States v. Booker, No. 04-104 (U.S. filed July 21, 2004, argued Oct. 4, 2004).
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